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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
UNASSIGNABLE FUTURE PAYMENTS UNDER AN INSURANCE POLICY AS CONSTITUTING A SPENDTHRIFT TRUsT.-Although based on

adequate grounds' without reliance upon the spendthrift trust
theory, the decision in Paraskeitz Holowaty for Use of2 Paul
gives
Cherka v. The Prudential Tsurance Company of Amria
an unusual extension to the spendthrift trust doctrine of Illinois
when it sets up as one of its findings that an insurance policy

providing for payment of the death benefit to the sole beneficiary
in sixty unassignable monthly installments of $100.03 each constitutes a spendthrift trust beyond the reach of the beneficiary's
creditors.

There can be a valid trust although the sole duty of the trustee
is to follow an affirmative direction to pay over fixed sums of

money.3 A spendthrift trust need not designate the beneficiary
1 The fact that the insurance contract designated the death benefits as unassignable makes available as a defense to a garnishment proceeding the
principle that the law will not enforce a compulsory assignment of a claim
which cannot be voluntarily assigned. See particularly St. Joseph Mfg. Co.
v. Miller, 69 Wis. 389, 34 N. W. 235 (1887).
2 282 Ill. App. 584 (1936).

8 Silverman v. Kristufek, 162 Ill. 222, 44 N. E. 430 (1896) ; Crow v. Crow,
348 Ill. 241, 180 N. E. 877 (1932).
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as a spendthrift, 4 nor is it necessary that the trustee be given the
power to withhold payments at his discretion; 5 and a provision
for payments from principal as well as income does not bring a
spendthrift trust within the reach of creditors. 6 But until the
Holowaty case was decided, the courts had not gone to the extreme of making a spendthrift thrust out of what would, for all
practical purposes, be a mere debt.
The case is an action of garnishment against the insurance
company. The obligation of the insurance company to the debtor
is based on a policy issued by the company to the debtor's husband, with the debtor named as beneficiary. The insured reserved
the right during his life to change the beneficiary, but this right
was not exercised. When the insured died, the debtor became
entitled under the terms of the policy to receive sixty monthly
instalments of $100 each, with interest. It was found in the trial
court that the insurance company was indebted to the debtor,
Mrs. Holowaty, in an amount exceeding the original judgment
in favor of her creditor.
The policy provided in part that "any instalment or instalments payable hereunder shall be unassignable after this Policy
shall become a claim by death." Further provisions were that
in the event that the beneficiary should predecease the insured,
the death benefit should be paid to the estate of the insured; or,
if the beneficiary should die before receiving all of the instalments of the death benefit, the balance should go at once to her
estate. The court found, in part, "that the proceeds of the
policy constituted a fund in the nature of a trust fund for the
benefit of the judgment debtor, which is not subject to garnishment under the statutes of this state. This seems to have been
the intention of the company and the insured."
This case should be distinguished from the more frequently
encountered cases on insurance trusts where the creditors of the
insured initiate the proceedings. There the trustee is usually a
corporate trustee and the question is usually whether or not the
trust was created in fraud of creditors or could be reached as a
Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N. E. 339 (1905).
5 Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. St. 585, 19 A. 1058 (1890).
6 Wagner v. Wagner, 244 I1. 101, 91 N. E. 66 (1910); Perabo v. Galla4

gher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N. E. 113 (1922) ; Adair v. Sharp, 49 Ohio App.
See also Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
507, 197 N. E. 399 (1934).
Collier, 222 Mass. 362, 111 N. E. 163 (1916), where it is said, ". . . whether
income or principal is placed beyond the power of alienation or of attachment,
the result to creditors of the beneficiary is merely a question of degree."
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part of the estate of the insured. 7 In the Holowaty case the
questions are, chiefly, whether there was an intent to create a
trust and, if there was, whether the necessary steps were taken.
The entire insurance contract is not reported, but the quoted
portions are in the usual form, indicating for the most part that
the insured intended to make certain payments in return for the
promise of the company to make certain other payments after
the death of the insured. The only wording from which a hint
of a trust intention could be construed is that of making the
benefit payments unassignable. Such words in a valid trust
would show an intent that the "spendthrift" rules apply, but
they would not, under ordinary construction, be sufficient in
themselves to make a trust of something that without them
would be a mere debt.
Aside from the possibility that the court put a strained construction upon the insurance contract, there remains the substantial objection that there has been no indication that there was
an ascertained trust fund. This objection is ably set out by
Bogert in his consideration of insurance company trusts in states
which, by statute; have authorized insurance companies to act
as trustees.
"Analyzing the insurance companies' trust," Bogert says, "it
would seem that during the life of the insured it could be treated
as a mere contract to set up a trust at the death of the insured.
This contract would be founded on ample consideratio, namely,
the payment of the premiums. It seems unnecessary to strive to
found a trust during the life of the insured on the insurer's
promise to pay. When the insured dies and the company sets
up a credit on its books and proceeds to carry out its so-called
trust, the transaction appears to be in fact a mere debt, due to
the lack of any duty on the part of the insurance company to
meet its obligations out of any particular assets. Conceivably
insured and insurer might agree that the company should hold
an undivided share of its assets in trust and this ought to be a
satisfactory res; but there is no such intention by either party. "s
In the case of The Congress Hotel Company v. Laura Martin9
there was a valid trust with the usual spendthrift provisions.
7 Gurnett v. The Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N. E. 250
(1934); People v. The Northern Trust Co., 289 II1. 475, 124 N. E. 662
(1920); Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899).
8 George Gleason Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (1935), II,

775, sec. 240.
9 312 Ill. 318, 143 N. E. 838 (1924).
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The trustee, in the exercise of its discretion, withheld a large portion of the income, building up a reserve which appeared to
exceed any possible necessities of the beneficiary. Yet a creditor
of the beneficiary was unable to reach this reserve, the court
saying, in part, "If a testator creates a spendthrift trust and
the payments exceed the amount which the beneficiary expends,
there will be some form or place where it can be reached by
creditors through a court of equity, but the courts of this state
have not been given any authority to appropriate to creditors
what might appear to be more than necessary for the declared
purpose of the trust." This reasoning is surprising less from the
viewpoint of public policy than from the fact that the chief justification for enforcing spendthrift provisions is the right of the
settlor to have the purposes of his trust fulfilled.' 0 To go a step
beyond The Congress Hotel Company case and to call the Holowaty insurance contract a spendthrift trust is to strain an
already liberal doctrine.
H. MACDONALD
JUDGMENT BASED ON STATE INCOME TAX DUE AS ENTITLED TO
FAITH AND CREDIT IN ANOTHER STATE.-To the query,
"Should a United States district court in and for the State of
Illinois, having jurisdiction of the parties, entertain jurisdiction
of an action based upon a judgment rendered by a Wisconsin
court for income tax due from the defendant to the State of Wisconsin?" the Supreme Court of the United States answered
affirmatively in the recent decision of Milwaukee County v. M. E.
White Company.' The county had originally obtained a judgment by default in its circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction, against the defendant herein, to cover taxes assessed against
the White Company upon income it had received from business
transacted within the state under state license. Suit was then
brought upon the judgment in the District Court for northern
Illinois, but the action was dismissed. The case reached the
Supreme Court on certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.
Thus the long unanswered question as to whether or not a
judgment recovered by a state in the collection of its revenue is
entitled to be recognized by another court under the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution and statutes of the United

FULL

10 Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247 (1884) and numerous cases following
its principle.

1 80 L. Ed. 155, 56 S. Ct. 229 (1935).
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States, requiring that one state give effect to the public acts and
judicial proceedings of every other state, seems to have been
definitely answered in the affirmative. The main contention of
the defendant was that because the original judgment was one
for taxes, it was therefore an exception to those requirements.
It has never been questioned in this country that one state
will not enforce the criminal laws of another. There is also
abundant authority to the effect that no state will execute the
penal laws of another. The collection of taxes has long been
considered to be of a similar nature. The statement that "one'
state does not enforce the penal or revenue laws of another
State" was made by Lord Mansfield, and is said to have originated in the time of Lord Hardwicke. 2 Although there is
little authority for the rule in decided cases, similar statements as
to the revenue laws have been made by text writers and are frequently made by way of dicta, so that it has been commonly
accepted as law. The reason behind this seems to be that an
interference between one state in the existing relationship between another state and its citizens, might result in embarrassment in the interpretation, enforcement, or policy of its laws.
The court declined to pass on the point whether or not one state
must enforce the revenue laws of another state, saying that a
possibility of such embarrassment on an original action would
not apply where the local tribunal had already given its judgment.3
After mentioning that upon a suit on a money judgment the
validity of the claim cannot be entered into but recovery can
2 29 Col. L. Rev. 782; other interesting articles on the decision of the
lower courts in the instant controversy and other cases related to the problem
are found in 19 Marquette L. Rev. 10; 42 Yale L. J. 1131; 18 Cornell L. J.
581; 26 Col. L. Rev. 464. See also 65 A. L. R. 1360.
3 The court in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company of New Orleans,
127 U. S. 265, 32 L. Ed. 239 (1888), where the action was one of debt upon a
judgment recovered by the State of Wisconsin against an insurance company
of the State of Louisiana, doing business in the former state, for a penalty for
the violation of a statute, said: "The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences
for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the
recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such
penalties. If this were not so, all that would be necessary to give ubiquitous
effect to a penal law would be to put the claim for a penalty into the shape of

a judgment."
The court in the instant case specifically referred to the case mentioned,
saying that it was making no decision on the question of whether or not one
state would enforce the penal laws of another, but insofar as it might be in
conflict with the revenue question involved in the present case, it was overruled.
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only be resisted on the ground that the court which rendered it
was without jurisdiction; that the obligation had been discharged; that it was a cause of action for which the state of the
forum had not provided a court; that it had been procured by
fraud; or as has been held in some few cases, that it is against
the public policy of the state of the forum, and citing most of
the leading decisions regarding these points, the opinion goes
on to state that in the latter case, which is the only one that can
here apply, "no state can be said to have a legitimate policy
against the payment of its neighbor's taxes, the obligation of
which has been judicially established by courts to whose judgments in practically every other instance it must give full faith
and credit."
In its decision the court interposed the statement that "a state
court in conformity to state policy, may, by comity, give a remedy which the full faith and credit clause does not compel." It
may therefore be argued that because of this statement, and the
fact that the question certified to, read "should" rather than
"must," that the decision does not demand that full faith and
credit be given. If the district court had taken jurisdiction and
objection was made thereto and the same question certified, the
argument would have had far more force, as it then might have
been said that the court's action was approved on the basis of
comity, and it took jurisdiction at its discretion. That the holding goes to the full extent suggested, however, seems conclusive
when one considers that the Supreme Court throughout its treatment of the case treated it as a question of full faith and credit,
at one point making the statement that it would "confine our
inquiry to the single question whether they must nevertheless
give full faith and credit to judgments for such taxes" and
apparently by way of summary, that "we conclude that a judgment is not to be denied full faith and credit in state and federal
courts merely because it is for taxes."
C. E.

HACKLANDER

RADIO BROADCAST OF NOTICE THAT EMPLOYER IS "UNFAIR" NOT
ENJOINABLE BY EQUITY.-In November, 1935, the Illinois Appel-

late Court for the First District, in an opinion delivered by Mr.
Justice Sullivan,1 held that, in a labor dispute, a labor organization has the right to broadcast its views on the fairness or unfair1 Leitzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station W.C.F.L. et al., 282 Ill. App.
203 (1935).
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ness of an employer toward organized labor and to advocate that
the public refrain from patronizing such employer; and that this
right cannot be interfered with by injunction, even though the
statements broadcast may be libelous, so long as they are no part
of a conspiracy to intimidate the employer or to injure his business. In the opinion the court repeats the oft-stated principle that
a court of equity will not enjoin the publication of libel as such,
and states that an examination of the cases cited by the plaintiff
shows that the injunction was granted in such cases to restrain
primarily unlawful acts amounting to intimidation, coercion, conspiracy, or boycott, and that the libel or slander was enjoined
merely as an incident of, or one of the means chosen for the accomplishment of the unlawful purpose.
The court cites the case of Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union,2 a case decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
in which the anti-injunction law of Illinois was held constitutional. In that case the court held that it was lawful, peaceably
and without threats to carry placards announcing a strike and
that the employer was not employing union labor. The court in
the principal case said that the exhibition of the placards in the
Fenske case was certainly a publication of the matters contained
therein and that the rule announced in that case was fully applicable to the facts in the principal case. This is certainly reasonable, for if the publication by one peaceful method is lawful,
the use of another peaceful method or medium in itself should
not make the publication unlawful.
It is notable that in the present case the court found that the
charge of conspiracy in the complaint was not proven, so that
the case should not be confused with cases in which an injunction
issued where a conspiracy was proven. Also it should be noted
that there is no element of intimidation, coercion, or boycott involved. It is evident that it would be practically impossible, by
the mere radio message here involved, to intimidate a hearer. It
consists merely of a request or plea, which is patently peaceable,
to the friends of union labor to refrain from dealing with an
individual who is unfair to organized labor.
In the principal case there is no implied threat that those who
disregard the request will suffer any injury at the hands of
labor. On this ground the case of Hey v. Wilson$ should be distinguished. In that case the members of the labor union were
2
3

358 II. 239, 193 N. E. 112 (1934).
232 I1. 389, 83 N. E. 928, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 85 (1908).
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enjoined from placing the plaintiff's name on the "unfair" list,
and "We Don't Patronize" list, where the customers of the
plaintiff to whom the lists were sent understood that if they continued to deal with the plaintiff they would suffer injury in
their business by loss of trade. The facts in that case constituted an illegal secondary boycott as defined in Toledo, Ann
Arbor & North Michigan Railway Company v. Pennsylvania4 as
follows: "a combination of many to cause a loss to one person
by coercing others, against their will, to withdraw from him their
beneficial business intercourse, through threats that, unless those
others do so, the many will cause a similar loss to them." The
element of threats is an important requisite in that type of
boycott which the courts deem illegal.
The case of Truax v. Corrigan,5 decided by the United States
Supreme Court, should be distinguished on similar grounds. In
that case the court found that the pickets aggressively annoyed prospective customers of the plaintiff and, by threats,
engendered in those customers a fear of injurious consequences.
The words of the opinion in that case are notable for their plain
inference as to what conduct would be lawful: "It was not lawful
persuasion or inducing. It was not a mere appeal to the sympathetic aid of would-be customers by a mere statement of the fact
of the strike and a request to withhold patronage." The last sentence is highly descriptive of the message and the method of
delivering it in the principal case.
Since it cannot be said that the decision in either the Hey v.
Wilson case or the Truax v. Corrigan case held that the mere
publication of a libelous statement that an employer was "unfair" was enjoinable, those decisions are not in conflict with the
decision in the principal case. But we need not be satisfied with
this negative assurance alone or with the principle that equity
will not enjoin a libel or slander. There is a former decision by
the Illinois appellate court, in the case of Philip Henrici Company v. Alexander,6 which held that although the picketing
of the plaintiff's restaurant was unlawful and enjoinable, it was
not illegal for the defendant to print in its "Baker's Journal"
that the plaintiff was unfair to organized labor.
When the facts in the principal case are considered and compared with those in other cases decided by the Illinois courts, the
4

5

54 F. 730 (1893) ; cited in opinion in principal case.
257 U. S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 229 (1921).

6 198 Ill. App. 568 (1916).
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decision is not an innovation. True, it involves the use of a comparatively new medium of communication-the radio-but, as
before stated, this fact alone does not change the principles underlying the decision. Also as before noted the decision does not
profess to change the law regarding equitable relief where the
libel complained of is incidental to threats, coercion, conspiracy,
or boycott. The opinion is very ably written and clearly sets out
the principles of law on which the decision is based, and therefore should have the desired effect of settling any doubts as to
the law on the question involved.
J. M. COUGHLAN
CONSTITUTIONAL

LIABILITY

OF STOCKHOLDERS

OF

INSOLVENT

BANK AND DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS REALIZED TO ITS CREDITORS.-

The Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of Heine v. Degen'
finally furnished an answer to the vexing and manifestly important question of how the creditors of an insolvent bank may
participate in the assets realized from the imposition of the stockholders' double liability provided for in the constitution of 1870,2
and also in the Banking Act of 1919.8 The decision holds that the
stockholders' liability, although measured by the debts which
were incurred during each period of stock ownership, is for the
benefit of the creditors generally. The appellants, who were
stockholders and had been assessed amounts equal to the full par
value of the shares they owned or had owned, contended that
the creditors' rights are individual and not collective, and that
their respective suits are combined for their convenience in matters of procedure only against various groups of stockholders,
and that the constitution is violated by a decree which does not
find who are the individual creditors and which stockholders are
liable to them.
The opinion of the majority of the court stated that the right
to maintain a representative suit in such a case as this had been
definitely established in Golden v. Cervenka4 and cases there
cited. It was held in that case that the legislature had no power
to authorize the bank receiver to sue for and collect such liabilities, but that it was proper to bring a representative suit against
1 362 Ill. 357, 199 N. E. 832 (1936).
2 Article XI, section 6.
3 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 16a, par. 6; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1935), Ch. 16Y, par. 6.
4

278 Ill. 409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917).
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all the stockholders, and that payment should be ordered to the
receiver appointed under the creditors' bill. So that decision was
of no assistance to appellants. Nor, said the court, was the present issue involved in the case of Sanders v. Merchants State
Bank.5 The principal points there decided were that the successive owners of a single share of stock should be held liable
to the amount of the par value of the stock for debts accruing
during the respective periods of ownership, the limiting factor
being the rule that the first money paid in is presumed to have
been the first paid out; that which Statute of Limitations applies
depends upon the character of each item of indebtedness and
when it started to run depends upon when it accrued; and that
an heir, legatee, or devisee of a stockholder who has died and
whose estate has been closed bears no liability.
No previous case had directly faced the issue of how the money
collected from stockholders should be distributed to the creditors. The language of the constitution is: "Every stockholder
in a banking corporation or institution shall be individually responsible and liable to its creditors, over and above the amount
of stock by him or her held, to an amount equal to his or her
respective shares so held, for all its liabilities accruing while he
or she remains such stockholder." The problem resolved itself
into the construction by the court of the word "creditors" so
used.
Under one construction the clause would limit a stockholder's
liability by, first, the par value of his shares, and second, by the
total amount of "liabilities accruing while he or she remained
such stockholder," and the money would be distributed ratably
to all of the creditors of the bank. Thus the language would not
be construed to in any way limit or designate which creditors
are entitled to share in the money due.
The other construction suggested by the court would conclude
that a stockholder must pay liabilities of the bank incurred
while he was such stockholder for the benefit of those creditors,
only, whose claims accrued during his ownership. This would
make the latter part of the clause modify and define "its creditors," as well as indicate the existence and extent of a stockholder's liability.
The court concluded that the former construction was proper
and undoubtedly expressed the purpose of the framers of the
constitution of 1870. "It also avoids the apparent incongruity of
5 349 Ill. 547, 182 N. E. 897 (1932).
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a representative suit being brought by creditors who would be
members of one class not alone for all the other members of their
class but for the various classes of creditors whose claims are
based upon liabilities of the bank incurred during the various
periods of stock ownership." The respective stockholders could
be in no way affected by this holding. The court noted that it had
similarly construed the word "creditors" as used in statutes relating to corporations, 6 that is to mean creditors generally, or all
the creditors. The courts of Nebraska and West Virginia, where
the state constitutions contain similar provisions, had also ar7
rived at the same construction.
The dissenting opinion8 vigorously denounced the conclusion of
the majority because of its dependence on the rules of the
Cervenka and Sanders cases. The opinion was expressed that
those cases should be overruled. Although the majority pointed
out that they were not controlling in this case, "the fact remains, however, that the trial court attempted to state an account
in accordance with those rules, and in affirming that decree the
effect is to re-affirm those principles which have been destructive
of state banking in Illinois." The ordinary meaning in law of
the verb "accrue" which appears in the constitutional provision,
supra, is "to become a present and enforcible right or demand."
The object sought to be obtained by the provision was the
familiar double liability which was known in various private
charters prior to the constitution of 1870. The intent was plainly
to impose this liability on owners of stock at the time of the
maturity of any of a bank's engagements. Nothing more can be
read into it. Had it been the intention of the framers that one
once a stockholder in a bank should forever remain subject to the
hazards of liability not matured or accrued during the period
of his stock ownership, different or additional words would have
been employed.
The minority further pointed out that those who are stockholders at the moment any obligation matures may be in fact
ascertained, and a court of equity can look behind or avoid any
fraudulent or fictitious transfer of stock; this would give cred6 Low v. Buchanan, 94 11. 76 (1879) ; Harper v. Union Mfg. Co., 100 Ill.
225 (1881).
7 In re Wilson's Estate, 127 Neb. 106, 254 N. W. 717 (1934) ; Rogers v.
Selleck, 117 Neb. 569, 221 N. W. 702 (1928); McClaren v.Anderson, 110
W. Va. 380, 158 S. E. 379 (1931); Benedum v. First Citizens Bank, 72 W.
Va. 124, 78 S. E. 656 (1913).
8 Written by Shaw, J., Orr and Herrick, JJ., concurring.
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itors a definite remedy, swiftly imposed and productive of immediate results, without protracted or expensive litigation,
while it has been proven that the direct opposite is realized in
practice from attempts to apply the theory accepted by the
majority.
The case of one appellant is interesting and worthy of note,
because of both his unique predicament and the drastic nature
of the holding against him. One Huot contended he was not the
holder of any shares. He had made an agreement with an officer
and director of the bank to become a stockholder and director on
condition that one Fred Snow was elected president in the reorganization of the bank. The day he paid for his stock was that
set for the election, but when he had paid and receipted for it, he
was told that the meeting was postponed, but that everything
would work out as he had been told. He got his money back ten
days later after threatening to sue. The court simply said, "In
a suit such as this it is no defense that a stockholder was induced
by fraud to buy stock."
J. M. HADSALL
BANK COLLECTION CODE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-In the recent
Illinois Supreme Court case of The People, ex rel. Barrett, Auditor of Public Accounts v. Union Bank and Trust Company,' the
act commonly known as the Bank Collection Code, 2 which was
adopted by the legislature on July 8, 1931, was held unconstitutional. The Union Bank and Trust Company had issued its draft
to the First National Bank of Freeport to cover clearings between them, as of March 2, 1933. The draft was never paid as
both banks failed to open after the national banking moratorium
of 1933, and the receiver of the national bank filed a petition
in the trial court, asking that he be allowed a preferred claim
against the assets of the state bank. Upon hearing, the three
judges of the Circuit Court, sitting en banc, denied the preference, allowing the claim as a common one, declaring that section
13 of the act, which deals with preferences, was unconstitutional
because it is in conflict with the pro rata distribution of the Fed-

1 362 Ill. 164, 199 N. E. 272 (1935).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 98, par. 219-233. The Bank
Collection Code, while often incorrectly referred to as one of the "Uniform

Acts," was prepared by counsel for the American Bankers' Association. It
should not be confused with the "Uniform Bank Collection Code" of which
the third tentative draft is contained in the "Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings (1931)."
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eral laws, 3 and with the decisions of the courts, 4 inasmuch as
the section attempts to control the distribution of the assets of
insolvent national banks; that from the title and definition of the
act itself, the legislature intended it to apply to both state and
national banks; that the act would not have been passed had
the legislature realized that it could not so apply; and that the
various parts of the act are so connected and dependent upon
each other that section 13 would not have been enacted so as to
apply to state banks if it would not also apply to national banks. 5
In his appeal, the receiver of the national bank laid particular
stress on the argument that the receiver of the state bank did not
have the necessary interest or belong to that class of persons entitled to question the constitutionality of section 13 of the statute; and that the only one entitled so to question it would be a
national bank receiver. He further argued that the statute had
already been held constitutional against receivers of state banks,
thereby preventing one from again raising the question here.6 In
disposing of these contentions, the Supreme Court called atten12 U. S. C. A. 194.
4 Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445, 27 L. Ed. 537
3

(1883) ; Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 40 L. Ed. 700 (1896) ;
First National Bank in St. Louis v. State of Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 68 L.
Ed. 486 (1924); Old Company's Lehigh Inc. v. Meeker, 71 F. (2d) 280
(1934) ; National Bank of America v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 71 F.
(2d) 618 (1934); Royal Mfg. Co. v. Spradlin, 6 F. Supp. 98 (1934), remn.%
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et al. v. Capital Nat. Bank of Lansing, 270 Mich. 314, 258 N. W. 778 (1935),
also held that the provisions of the Bank Collection Code, were inapplicable
to national banks as being in conflict with Federal laws.
5 Sec. 13 (2) of the Code reads as follows:
"Except in cases where an item or items is treated as dishonored by nonpayment as provided in Section 11, when a drawee or payor bank has presented to it for payment an item or items drawn upon or payable by or at
such bank and at the time has on deposit to the credit of the maker or drawer
an amount equal to such item or items and such drawee or payor shall fail
or close for business as above, after having charged such item or items to the
account of the maker or drawer thereof or otherwise discharged his liability
thereon but without such item or items having been paid or settled for by the
drawee or payor either in money or by an unconditional credit given on its
books or on the books of any other bank, which has been requested or accepted so as to constitute such drawee or payor or other bank debtor therefor,
the assets of such drawee or payor shall be impressed with a trust in favor
of the owner or owners of such item or items for the amount thereof, or for
the balance payable upon a number of items which have been exchanged, and
such owner or owners shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon such assets,
irrespective of whether the fund representing such item or items can be
traced and identified as part of such assets or has been intermingled with or
converted into other assets of such failed bank."
6 McQueen v. Randall, 353 Ill. 231, 187 N. E. 286 (1933) ; People v. Dennhardt, 354 Ill. 450, 188 N. E. 464 (1933).
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tion to the fact that the previous cases involving the constitutionality of the act presented different problems than the instant
one. It acknowledged the rule that "where a part of a statute
is unconstitutional that fact does not authorize courts to declare
the remainder void unless all the provisions are connected in
subject matter, depending on each other, operating together for
the same purpose, or are otherwise so connected in meaning that
it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one
without the other." Therefore, the right of the state bank receiver to contest the validity of section 13 depended upon
whether or not his objections affected the entire act. The real
question was whether or not this provision was so related to and
bound up with the subject matter of the act, that without it the
legislature would not have passed the statute.
After adopting a similar reason to that of the trial court in
declaring section 13 of the act invalid, the court went on to state
that by the act certain rights had been taken away and had been
compensated for by others, that its provisions were dependent
and mutually connected, and that it comprised "one entire
scheme or design." It then declared that even after resolving
all doubts in favor of validity, the act, with the invalid portion
removed, is not the one which the legislature7 passed or intended
to pass, and therefore, the entire act is void.
C. E. HACKLANDER
PROCEDURE IN MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO ON MOTION

VACATE JUDGMENT

BY

CONFESSION.-Notwithstanding

TO

rule 190

of the Municipal Court Rules,1 the Illinois Appellate Court in
the recent case of McKenna v. Formans has held that the pro7 The same question raised in the instant case was raised in Twin Falls
Bank & Trust Co. v. Pringle, 43 P. (2d) 515 (Ida., 1935), but the court
said that the manner in which the receivership of the closed bank in question
had been or was being conducted, was not an issue so that the controversy
need not be considered; in Madden v. Wilde, 49 P. (2d) 637 (Wyo., 1935),
it was argued that as a part of the statute was invalid, all of it should be so
declared, but the court refused to consider the point, saying it had not been
argued. It may be well to point out that other states might reach a different
conclusion under similar facts to the principal case, as in Illinois the act provides for preferences when a bank is closed by either the Auditor of the Public Accounts or the Comptroller of the Currency, strengthening the inference
that the intention of the legislature was to have the act apply to both national
and state banks, while in most states the act provides for preferences when
the bank is taken charge of by the proper state officer only.
1 Civil Practice Rules of the Municipal Court adopted Nov. 1, 1933. This
rule is superseded by Revised Civil Practice Rules of the Municipal Court
adopted Nov. 1, 1935, Rules 187-192.
2 283 Ill. App. 606 (1936).
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cedure to be followed for the vacating of judgments by confession more than thirty days after their entry is the same as that
which has obtained heretofore.
In the instant case, defendants were granted leave to appear
and defend on motion made more than thirty days after the
entry of a judgment by confession, and plaintiffs contended that
the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter such an order,
but should have required a petition under section 21 of the
Municipal Court Act.8
On review, the court decided that the lower court lost jurisdiction to modify or set aside its judgment after thirty days and
that the procedure which had been previously uniformly followed, that is, the filing of a petition under section 21 invoking
the special equitable powers of the Municipal Court, was the
4
proper method of procedure in the circumstances.
On rule 190, cited by defendants in support of their position,
the court stated that rules of practice adopted by the court must
not be inconsistent with a statute in relation to substantive
law. 5
The effect of this decision is that despite new rules, procedure
for vacating judgments by confession more than thirty days
after their entry remains unchanged. The petitioner in such
cases must set forth grounds which would entitle him to equitable
relief, and the respondent has the right to answer the petition, 6
thus creating an issue, and to have that issue determined independently of the suit in which the judgment was entered, even
though the result of such determination might be the vacation of
that judgment.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
APPEAL UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE AcT.-The Appellate Court of
Illinois, First District, in Lanquist v. Grossman' had occasion to
construe section 76 of the Civil Practice Act and the rules of
court relating to appeal. This was an appeal by the plaintiff
from an adverse judgment entered against him in the Municipal
Court. He filed notice of appeal, but did not within ten days
file his praecipe for record designating the parts of the trial
court record he desired to be incorporated in the record on ap3
4
5
6

Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 37, par. 409.
The statute grants express equity powers in this circumstance.

Rozier v. Williams, 92 Ill. 187 (1879).
34 C. J. 319, 320, secs. 540, 541.
1 282 Ill. App. 181 (1935).
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peal as provided by the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court.2
Fearing the appeal might be dismissed because of his failure to
file the praecipe within the ten-day period, within the ninety
days allowed for appeal, the plaintiff filed a second notice of
appeal. Pursuant to his second notice he filed his praecipe for
record, filed his report of proceedings at the trial, and transmitted
the record including the report to the reviewing court within
the prescribed period.
On motion of the defendant to dismiss, the plaintiff contended
that he had three alternatives open to him after he had failed
to file his praecipe within the proper time: (1) dismiss the first
and sue out the second appeal; (2) abandon his first appeal and
without dismissing it, proceed with the second appeal; or (3) sue
out the second appeal without dismissing the first and let the reviewing court determine which appeal should be prosecuted and
which should be dismissed.
Although there may be authority for the plaintiff's contentions
under the old practice, the Civil Practice Act and Rules of the
Supreme Court provide for only one appeal. 3 The court said,
"The filing of notice of appeal on June 15, 1934, was jurisdictional and constituted a pending perfected appeal which was a
continuance of the proceeding in the court below, and we are at
a loss to understand how under the terms of the act, when the
jurisdiction of the court had attached by an appeal already perfected and pending, a subsequent notice of appeal could have any
force or effect." The provision in the act that it shall be liberally construed, 4 it was held, did not contemplate a total or even
partial disregard of the rules of the Supreme Court. In Corrigan
v. Von Schill School of Chiropody,5 when the question of a sec2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 259.36: "In appeals
taken directly to the Appellate or Supreme Court, the appellant shall within
10 days after the notice of appeal has been filed, prepare and file a praecipe
with the clerk of the trial court, with proof of service, and serve a copy
thereof on the appellee or his attorney, in which appellant shall designate
what parts of the trial court record are to be incorporated in the record on
appeal. .. "
3 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 200, sec. (2): "An
appeal shall be deemed perfected when the notice of appeal shall be filed in
the lower court. After being duly perfected no appeal shall be dismissed
without notice, and no step other than that by which the appeal is perfected
shall be deemed jurisdictional."
4 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 128: "This Act shall
be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and
finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties, and the
rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed
shall not apply to this act or to the rules made pursuant thereto."
5 277 Ill. App. 350 (1934).
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ond appeal was incidentally before the court, it was said, "There
is no provision in the rules of court for allowing a second notice
of appeal, so that the second notice of appeal filed by the defendant was a nullity." Since the second notice in the present case
was of no effect, it was held the motion of the defendant to dismiss should be sustained. As the first appeal was the only lawful
appeal, and as the record on appeal was not filed within the time
fixed by the rules of court,6 the defendant's motion to dismiss it
was also sustained.
The limiting of time in which the appellant may complete each
step in the appeal may work a hardship on the attorney and his
client. One of the chief reasons for substituting the Civil Practice Act for the old form of pleading was to simplify the procedure and to prevent one who had a cause of action, or a valid
defense from losing out because of some technicality. The purpose of the framers of the act is commendable, but the decision in
Lanquist v. Grossman would indicate that the strict provisions
in the act for prosecuting an appeal tend to defeat its purpose.
W. R.

MACMILLAN

ACTIONS FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS BROUGHT IN THE FED-

COURT.-The statute in Illinois which abolishes actions for
alienation of affections' will not protect a defendant resident in
Illinois from suit in a Federal district court of Illinois, by a
plaintiff resident in a state where the wrongful acts were committed, and actionable.
The recent case of Wawrzin v. Rosenberg2 was brought by a
plaintiff resident in New Jersey in a Federal district court in
New York, against a resident of New York for alienation of
affections. At the time the complaint was filed, a New York
statute abolishing the remedy for alienation of affections was in
force, under an express legislative determination that such actions were against public policy.' A similar statute of New Jersey, within four more days, would have barred the filing of the
4
suit in New Jersey.
ERAL

6 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, par. 259.36(2):

"...

but

where the record shall have been filed in the reviewing court after the
expiration of the time fixed by this rule but before application is made by
the appellee [to dismiss], the reviewing court shall dismiss the appeal."
1 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 38, par. 246.1.
2 12 F.Supp. 548 (1935).
3 Civil Practice Act, N. Y., par. 61-a, as added by Laws N. Y. 1935, c.

263.

4 N. J. St. Ann. 1935, secs. 163-411 et seq.
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As the case stood, then, the plaintiff had a cause of action in
New Jersey on August 22, 1935, for wrongful acts committed
there, which he alleged alienated the affections of his wife. The
suit was brought on August 22, 1935, in the Federal court for
the Eastern District of New York on the grounds of diversity of
citizenship. The defendant's motion to dismiss, because the suit
was barred by the statute of New York and was against public
policy, was denied.
The question for the court was what effect such a state statute has on the exercise of jurisdiction by a Federal court, the
territorial limits of which lie within such state.
The court held that the action was in the nature of trespass
to the person, was transitory, and governed by the lex loci delicti,
and, therefore, the plaintiff had the right to bring his action in
the Federal court, the jurisdictional requirements of diversity of
citizenship and amount involved having been met.
There is adequate authority for the principle that state statutes cannot limit the jurisdiction of Federal courts, in a case
cognizable therein under the Federal statutes and Constitution. 5
It is also well established that if the necessary diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount exist, the parties have a right
to have their controversies determined in the Federal courts, the
motive for invoking the jurisdiction being immaterial.6 Nor can
the fact that the plaintiff is given a different remedy in the state
7
courts affect the jurisdiction of a Federal court.
Therefore, it seems that the decision is thoroughly sound on
the jurisdictional question, for the plaintiff had the undeniable
right to invoke the Federal jurisdiction, and the court had no
discretion to decline such jurisdiction, since the case was one
to which its powers extended, and the power was properly
invoked.
As to the law which the court will apply, there is no dispute
5 Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 35 L. Ed. 358 (1891) ; Miss. Mills v. Cohn,
150 U. S. 202, 37 L. Ed. 1052 (1893); David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Auto.
Club of America, 225 U. S. 489, 56 L. Ed. 1177 (1912) ; Guffey v. Smith,
237 U. S. 101, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915); Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261
U. S. 491, 67 L. Ed. 763 (1923) ; Farrell v. Stoddard, 1 F. (2d) 802 (1924);
Morrill v. Am. Reserve Bond Co., 151 F. 305 (1907).
6 Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632, 51 L. Ed. 656 (1907); Chicago v.
Mills, 204 U. S. 321, 51 L. Ed. 504 (1907); Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400,
50 L. Ed. 801 (1906) ; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 54 L. Ed. 762
(1910) ; Willcox v. Cons. Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. Ed. 382 (1909) ; Ex
parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908); Bean v. Stoddard, 206
N. Y. S. 753 (1923).
7

Herring v. Modesto Irr. Dist. 95 F. 705 (1899).
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that it should be the lex loci delicti, unless the court can find
reasons why that doctrine of the common law should yield to
the public policy of the forum. The court pointed out that had
the wrongful acts been committed in New York, they would have
been constrained to dismiss the case on the principle of Bucher v.
Cheshire Railroad Company.8 That was a case where the policy
of the State of Massachusetts, as expressed in its decisions holding
a plaintiff's violation of a Sunday law a defense to the liability
of a carrier, was recognized, and prevented a passenger, injured
while travelling in Massachusetts on a Sunday, from recovering
in a Federal court in Massachusetts. But, the court in the instant
case added, here the wrongful acts were committed in New
Jersey, the courts of which would have permitted the action at
the time the complaint was filed in the Federal court in New
York.
The principle of comity, and the question of whether it will be
recognized so as to permit a cause, actionable or valid where it
arose, but contrary to the public policy of the forum, to be
enforced, is a question of some conflict, particularly as it involves contracts containing stipulations against liability. The
problem does not arise in suits in the Federal courts between
citizens of different states of the United States, on transitory
causes clearly actionable by the law of the place where the
wrong occurred or the contract was made. It is then not a question of comity at all, for the Federal court is bound to take
jurisdiction when the jurisdictional requirements of diverse citizenship and amount involved are met.
The only contention that can be offered to support the theory
that the courts of the United States should, in suits between
citizens of the different states, consider the public policy of the
forum, must be based on the act of Congress9 which states that
the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States where they apply.
This has been construed a mere legislative declaration of a rule
which would have been recognized in the absence of any express
legislative sanction, and has been applied in scores of cases where
the application of the law of the state in which the Federal court
sits is the alternative if the general law of the country is not
8 '125 U. S. 555, 31 L. Ed. 795 (1888).
9 U. S. Rev. Stat. par. 721.
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applicable. Obviously the principle has no force where the general law and the lex loci delicti are the same, unless there are
limitations to the latter.
That there are limitations to the doctrine that the lex loci
delicti governs the liability of a defendant in tort, is suggested
by Professor Beale in his comments on the decision in Bradford Electric Light Company, Inc. v. Clapper.10 In that case
an action was begun in the state court of New Hampshire and
removed to a Federal court in New Hampshire on the grounds of
diversity of citizenship. Justice Brandeis held that no action
could be maintained in New Hampshire on account of the tort
committed there since the plaintiff administratrix was bound
by the terms of the Vermont compensation statute which provided that employer and employee could agree to refrain from
suing elsewhere for injuries received out of the state. It was
held that the contract of employment having been made in Vermont, both parties had accepted the act as a term of the contract, and since a Vermont court could have enjoined the suit
abroad, the defendant had an equitable defense to the New
Hampshire action for wrongful death occurring in New Hampshire during the course of the decedent's employment."
Professor Beale feels that the decision in the Clapper case
amounts to saying that a contract made in one state can change
the law of another state, though the contract-to refrain from
sueing elsewhere-was a purely fictitious one, and in effect, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that no action could
be maintained in New Hampshire on account of a tort there
committed.
The facts in the Clapper case bear no analogy to those in the
instant case, but the reasoning therein suggests that it would be
as logical to construe the public policy of the forum as binding
on a Federal court sitting therein, as to hold a statute of a state
binding on a Federal court sitting elsewhere, since in both instances the public policy or the statute would have been the only
obstacle to the clear application of the doctrine that the lex loci
delicti governs the liability of a defendant in tort.
KATHERINE H. JOHNSON
STRIKING PORTION OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT.-A mo-

tion to dismiss a bill of complaint because the facts alleged
10 48 Harv. L. Rev. 620 (1935).

11 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932).
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therein are insufficient to state a cause of action, for reasons set
forth specifically in the motion, is in the nature of a demurrer
under section 45, sub-section 1 of the Civil Practice Act of 1933,
and after such a motion has been filed, it should be set down for
hearing without the filing of further pleadings. Therefore, in the
recent case of Bohnert v. Ben Hut Life Association,' the Supreme

Court of Illinois held that it was not error for the trial court
to deny the cross-motion of the plaintiff to strike certain parts of
the defendant's motion. After stating that such a motion as
filed here by the defendant is in the nature of a demurrer, the
court say they know of no practice whereby part of a demurrer
can be stricken, upon which premise they base their decision.
M. H. TUTTLE
RELEVANT OBJECTIONS

FITE

BEFORE BOARD OF ELECTION COM-

MISSIONERS AS ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEDGED FROM CiviL ACTION.-It is

not disputed in the recent case of Kimball v. Ryan' that a person is free from liability for relevant defamatory statements
filed in a judicial proceeding,2 although he may be dealt with
under the criminal law.$ The Illinois Appellate Court, however,
does decide that this rule also reaches objections and affidavits
fied before the Board of Election Commissioners, as that board
is a quasi-judicial body.
The plaintiff had circulated nominating petitions for a candidate for alderman. The defendant filed objections, supported by
affidavits, to such petitions with the Board of Election Commissioners of Cook County; the defendant's complaint was to the
effect that the names on the petitions were forgeries, and the circulator did not personally circulate the petition as required by
law. To support his objections, the defendant filed 216 affidavits
allegedly signed by persons who denied that they had signed the
plaintiff's petition.
The plaintiff claimed damages for libel based on inference of
perjury. The court disallowed the claim of the plaintiff because
the Board of Election Commissioners is a quasi-judicial body and
the sworn testimony of the petitions and affidavits are privileged
if found pertinent to the inquiry.
1 362 Ill. 403 (1936).
283 Ill. App. 456 (1936).
Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 Ill. App. 503 (1930) ; Andrews v. Gardiner, 224
N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918).
8 Cooley on Torts (3rd ed.), I, 425.
'
2
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The Board of Election Commissioners is a statutory4 organization consisting of three persons, one at least from each of the
two leading political parties of the state and appointed by the
county court. Such commissioners are empowered to hear evidence concerning objections to nominating petitions, to hear evidence under oath regarding residents of lodging houses and to
administer all oaths and affirmations required in the administration of the office. Based on such qualifications, the court said:
"We think these powers make the board a quasi-judicial body."
This decision is not out of line. Courts generally hold that
communications made before tribunals having attributes similar
to those of courts, are privileged as such bodies are quasijudicial. 5 The court held this board was quasi-judicial from a
general consideration of its powers. In Blakeslee v. Carroll, 6
however, an investigating committee of aldermen which had
been given power by the president of the aldermanic council to
subpoena and swear witnesses, was held to have no judicial character or function. The board here had similar powers but it was
created by the legislature which has the constitutional power to
create courts ;7 the Blakeslee case concerned a board created by
an executive. From all considerations, therefore, a board constituted as this one could be fairly held to be of a quasi-judicial
capacity; it is created by the legislature with the powers to require sworn testimony upon certain hearings of specific subjects.
It follows therefrom that such testimony as is pertinent is absolutely privileged in a civil suit.
J. L. PoRam
APPEALS BY PUBLIC CORPORATIONS UNDER THE CIVIL PRACTICE
AN APPEAL WILL OPERATE AS SUPERsEDFAs.-The
Illinois Appellate Court has recently construed subsection 3 of
section 82 of the Civil Practice Act of 1933, which deals with
appeals "by a public, municipal, governmental or quasi-public
corporation," and which provides that where an appeal is prosecuted by such a corporation, "or by any public officer in his
official capacity for the benefit of the public, the trial or reviewing court or any judge thereof, may, without requiring any bond
to be given, order that the appeal shall operate as a supersedeas."'
ACT-WHEN

4

5

Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 46, pars. 174, 286.

Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918).

6 64 Conn. 223, 29 A. 473 (1894).
7 Illinois Constitution of 1870, Art. VI, sec. 1.
1 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, sec. 82 (3).
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In People ex rel. Dilks v. Board of Education,2 the court held
that the word "may" in the above section of the act makes the
waiving of the bond discretionary with the court, but that in
order for the court to make use of its discretion, the appellant
must give notice and have the court enter an order that the
appeal shall operate as a supersedeas without requiring a bond.
In this case, which was a proceeding in the nature of quo
warranto against the defendant Board of Education, the trial
court in its judgment granted an appeal to the defendant without a bond, the appeal to operate as a supersedeas. The appellate
court held that the trial court had no authority under the provisions of the Civil Practice Act of 1933 to enter such an order,
that it did not perfect an appeal, nor did it have the effect of
making any notice of appeal that might be given operate as a
supersedeas without the giving of a bond. The court said, "It is
just as necessary to give notice and have an order entered by
the trial court that the appeal shall operate as a supersedeas
without requiring any bond to be given as it is to give notice
and give and file a bond and have the same approved by an order
of the trial court in order that the notice of appeal shall operate
as a supersedeas." Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction
within the term of the court to modify the judgment entered by
striking certain words therefrom.
In the case of Kelly v. School Directors,8 the Illinois Appellate
Court held appeal from an order of a justice of the peace without
being required to give bond, proper, interpreting the Act of
1879. 4 In Board of Education v. Board of Education,5 the same
court by way of dictum said that no bond should be required of
non-high school district directors defending a suit in their official
capacity for the benefit of the public, on the basis of section 98 of
the Act of 1907.6 In the case of drainage districts,7 and counties
and cities,8 the courts also held that bond was excused under the
old practice.
It will be noted that subsection 3 of section 82 of the present
2

283 Ill. App. 378 (1936).

3 66 Ill. App. 134 (1895).
4

II. Sess. Laws 1879, p. 232.

5 242 Ill. App. 488 (1926).
6

Cahill's Ii. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 110, par. 98.

7 Commissioners Union Drain. Dist. v. Highway Com'rs., 87 Ill. App. 93

(1899), rev'd, 199 Ill. 80, 64 N. E. 1079 (1902). Also, Commissioners of
Havana Township v. Kelsey, 120 Ill. 482, 11 N. E. 256 (1887).
8 City of Chicago v. O'Hare, 124 IM. App. 290 (1906). Also, Wetzel v.
County, 143 IM. App. 178 (1907).
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act is substantially the same as section 98 of the Practice Act of
1907, except that such corporations and officers do not have an
absolute right to supersedeas without bond, and the granting
thereof is within the discretion of the trial or reviewing court.
It seems that by reason of this change in practice, under the decision in the case at hand, it is now necessary to give notice and
have an order entered by the court granting a supersedeas without bond, since it is no longer a matter of right, but solely within
the discretion of the court.
M. H. TUTTLE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-

DICT AS PROVIDED IN CIVIL PRACTICE ACT AND COMMON LAW
JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO.-In Malewski v. Machie-

wich 1 the Illinois Appellate Court decided that a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as provided for in the
Illinois Civil Practice Act, should be determined by an examination of the evidence and resolving therefrom whether the motion
should be granted. At common law in this state, as held in
several appellate court decisions given prior to January 1, 1934,2
the right to a judgment non obstante veredicto could be determined from the pleadings alone and the court could not look to
the evidence. This case demonstrates the improvement in this
respect accorded by the Civil Practice Act. Here the jury in the
court below found for the plaintiff, which verdict at common law
could not have been subject to a successful motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto because the pleadings of the plaintiff
alleged sufficient facts to allow the case to go to the jury. The
court nevertheless allowed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff's evidence did not sustain his allegations. This is in accord with the Civil Practice Act
which provides: "The power of the court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be exercised in all cases, where,
under the evidence in the case, it would have been the duty of
the court to direct a verdict without submitting the case to the
jury.'

'

J. L. PORTER
FORFEITED LEASE AS CLOUD ON LESSOR'S TITLE.-In the case of
Hill v. 1550 Hinman Ave. Building Corporation, recently deApp. 593 (1936).
282 Ill,
2 Modern Woodmen of America v. Blair, 263 I1. App. 387 (1931);
App. 590 (1909).
Aldrich v. Mathias, 141 Ill.
3 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 110, sec. 259.22.
1
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cided by the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District,1 a
ninety-nine-year lease, duly recorded, was twice assigned. Both
asignments were recorded and both assignees executed and recorded trust deeds, mortgaging their interests under the lease.
There also appeared of record mechanics' liens and judgment
liens against the leasehold interest. Because of defaults in the
performance of covenants in the lease, the lessors entered the
premises pursuant to a provision in the lease, declared the lease
ended, and filed a complaint to set aside as clouds on their title
the lease, assignments, trust deeds, and lien claims. The court,
in reversing a decree for plaintiffs, held that the lease was not a
cloud on the title of the plaintiffs and that, consequently, the
assignments, trust deeds, and lien claims were not.
The theory of plaintiffs' case was that equity has jurisdiction
to remove as a cloud on title an instrument which, though originally valid, has become invalid by subsequent events.2 The appellate court, admitting the soundness of this doctrine, declared that
they were unable to see how the lease, a "valid instrument,"
which by its terms admitted the title of the plaintiffs, could be a
cloud on their title, and that terminating the lease could affect
only the tenancy of the defendants and it could not create a
cloud where none existed before. Courts of several other states
and Federal courts have come to the opposite conclusion. 8
It is true that a lessee cannot deny the lessor's title. Nevertheless a leasehold interest decreases the lessor's interest, and an
unrestricted fee is a greater estate than a fee out of which a
ninety-nine-year lease has been carved. In Island Coal Company
v. Combs et al.,4 involving a bill by a lessor to quiet title to real
estate, it was held that the right or title which the defendant
asserted under his lease was "adverse" to the plaintiff and, if
shown to be invalid or ineffective, would serve to cast a cloud on
plaintiff's title. The Michigan Supreme Court held that a lease
became "void" by the reentry of the lessor for nonperformance. 5
1 282 Ill. App. 109 (1935).
2 Redmond v. Packenham, 66 Ill. 434 (1872) ; Frederick v. Ewrig, 82 Ill.
363 (1876).
3 Mehaffey's Appeal, 4 Pennyp. 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. R., 1884) ; Pendill v.
Union Mining Co., 64 Mich. 172, 31 N. W. 100 (1887) ; Nickerson v. Canton
Marble Co., Limited, 35 App. Div. 111, 54 N. Y. S. 705 (1898) ; Island Coal
Co. v. Combs, 152 Ind. 379, 53 N. E. 452 (1899); Big Six Development Co.
v. Mitchell, 138 F. 279, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332 (1905) ; Shannon v. Long,
180 Ala. 128, 60 So. 273 (1912).
4 152 Ind. 379, 53 N. E. 452 (1899).
5 Pendill v. Union Mining Co., 64 Mich. 172, 31 N. W. 100 (1887).
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In the instant case the court's treatment of the lease as still
valid may be partially explained by a portion of the plaintiffs'
brief and argument in which, replying to defendants' brief and
argument, they stated that the indenture of lease "was a valid
instrument when made, and though the leasehold which it created
has been terminated, it is a valid instrument now, for the purpose
of fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties while the leasehold was in existence and on and after its termination." Unfortunately, the court clung to this as an admission by the plaintiffs that the lease was somehow valid other than as being an
instrument to refer to only as evidence in ascertaining, for instance, that the leasehold interest was terminated in compliance
with the terms of the indenture.
The court stated that there was merit in the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs should have brought a direct action
to determine that the defendants were in default but instead
"elected to bring an action under the guise of a bill to remove
a cloud, whereby they seek to have the court remove the lease
in question from the record upon the assumption that defaults
have existed and that the plaintiffs have complied with the
terms of said lease and successfully terminated the same and
established their right to such fund on deposit."
However, the reentry and taking possession by the lessor was
the mode agreed upon by the parties to the lease by which the
election to forfeit should be declared; the lessor had the right
to resort to it. 6 The court is asked, in effect, to ascertain whether
or not a completed forfeiture exists and, if so, to remove the
cloud.7 Certainly it would be a matter of defense if no default
existed or if termination of the lease by the lessors was not made
in compliance with the lease.
Probably the fundamental reason for equity's removing clouds
on title is that outstanding invalid instruments are calculated
to affect the marketability of the title of the one in possession,
who is without remedy at law. 8 In the instant case an examina6 See footnote 5.
7 Pendill v. Union Mining Co., 64 Mich. 172, 31 N. W. 100 (1887) ; Big
Six Development Co. v. Mitchell, 138 F. 279, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332 (1905).
8 "The only question remaining is whether or not the prayer of the complainant should be granted, and a decree be granted that the said lease be
delivered up and cancelled as null and void, and functus officio. . . . There is
no allegation of fraud, accident, or mistake, and if complainant is entitled to
any relief in this proceeding it is on the principle of quia timet. The principle
upon which these bills are based is simply that it is inequitable that the party
in possession should be embarrassed by a hostile claim hanging over him,
which, although not actively asserted and not of any validity, is calculated to
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tion of the record title by a prospective purchaser or mortgagee
would indicate that the lessees have the same rights now under
the lease that they had when the term commenced. The court
suggested that the plaintiffs' possession of the land "is notice
to all persons dealing with it of whatever rights the one in possession claims," and that "plaintiffs have the right to record
copies of the notices of termination and the affidavit of service,
which would be further notice to the world of plaintiffs' claims
as to the lease."
In regard to the first suggestion, a bill to remove a cloud on
title will lie only where the plaintiff is in possession of the land
or where it is vacant and unoccupied.9 It is never a defense to
the bill that his possession is notice of whatever rights he claims.
Regarding the second suggestion, even if plaintiffs did record
copies of the notices of termination and the affidavit of service,
the question would still lie on the record whether or not the
lessees had committed defaults and whether or not the notice of
termination had been made in conformity with the provisions of
the lease. The recording would only be notice of "plaintiff's
claims as to the lease."
In view of the facts, first, that a forfeited lease of record evidences an interest in the lessors' land which no longer exists,
second, that the lessors had a right to terminate the leasehold
interest themselves without asking the court to declare the forfeiture, and third, that the recorded indenture of lease obstructs
the marketability of the lessors' full title, it would seem that the
relief in the present case should have been granted.
J. J. LANNON
WHO ARE CREDITORS UNDER THE BULK SALES AcT.-In the
recent case of Coon v. Doss,' the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the Bulk Sales Act cannot be invoked by assignees of creditors so as to permit one who took an assignment of the vendor's
note, subsequent to the sale of the vendor's property, to attack

affect the marketability of his title: Bispham Equity, § 575 ....
"... Here is a lease outstanding, the conditions of which have been violated,
and it is therefore, of no validity. But is it not calculated to affect the marketability of complainant's title? May not the instrument be vexatiously or
injuriously used against the lessor? . . . Has not this instrument, although
valid originally, become functus officio by subsequent events, and according
to the original intent and understanding of the parties?" Mehaffey's Appeal,
4 Pennyp. 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. R., 1884).
9 Figge v. Rowlen, 185 I1. 234, 57 N. E. 195 (1900).
1 361 Ill.
515 (1935).
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such sale on the ground that the provisions of the statute were
not complied with.
In 1927 Coon executed and delivered to a bank his unsecured
promissory note due in six months. In 1930, Coon, who had been
farming on 320 acres which he had rented since 1895, executed
a bill of sale to his landlord of most of the personal property
owned and used by Coon on the farm. The same day the landlord leased the farm to Coon's son, Lawrence, and sold him the
same property for the same consideration. At the time of these
transactions there was an unpaid balance due on the matured
note. It was conceded that no attempt had been made by Coon
to comply with the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act.
In 1934 the bank sold and assigned to Doss all of its assets,
including Coon's note. Doss obtained a judgment by confession
against Coon and the sheriff levied on the property in the control and possession of Lawrence.
The present action was instituted by Lawrence to try the right
of property, and Doss claimed that he was a creditor within the
contemplation of the Bulk Sales Act and therefore entitled to
treat the sale to the landlord as a nullity and to levy on the
property in question.
The appellate and supreme courts affirmed the judgment for
Lawrence. The decision was based on repeated holdings of the
court that the act makes certain sales of property fraudulent as
to those persons who were creditors of the vendor at the time
of the sale ;2 and that, since the defendant Doss did not become a
creditor of Coon until some three years after the sale alleged to
be fraudulent took place, he cannot claim the benefits of the
act, notwithstanding that he was an assignee of one who was a
creditor within the meaning of the act at the time of the transfer.
The general purpose of these statutes in the various states is
the same-to prevent the passing of an unqualified title to goods
in bulk until the creditors of the vendor have been paid in full.
The Illinois act as now in force was passed in 19133 and was
modeled after the New York act of 1905, and the interpretation
placed thereon by the New York courts has frequently been followed by Illinois. In both statutes the word "creditor" is used
in three aspects: first, the list of creditors to be furnished by the
2

Tipsword v. Doss, 273 Ill. App. 1 (1933); Smead Co., Inc. v. Johnson,

Inc., 262 Ill. App. 385 (1931); Lawndale Sash & Door Co. v. West Side
Trust & Savings Bank, 207 Ill. App. 3 (1917) ; Boxwell v. Lion Oil Co., 250
Ill. App. 127 (1928).
8 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1929), Ch. 121 a, par. 1 et seq.
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vendor; second, the creditors to be notified by the purchaser; and,
third, the creditors against who the sale is fraudulent and void.
The decisions are fairly uniform in all the states that the act
applies only to creditors at the time of the sale alleged to be in
violation of the statute, and not to creditors whose claims have
come into existence subsequently to the transfer; that the act
protects persons who were merely general creditors of the
vendor in other transactions, and is not limited to creditors of
merchandise; that the act is not confined to judgment creditors;
and that the act does not apply to parties holding claims in tort,
4
unliquidated claims, nor contingent claims.
Curiously enough, there appears to be no decision in Illinois,
previous to the instant one, where the court had to decide
whether an assignee of a creditor comes within the protection
of the act, so as to entitle him to attack the sale as fraudulent.
Obviously he could not be a creditor to be included on the list
furnished by the vendor or notified by the purchaser. A New
York case decided in 1916, and cited by the court in the principal case, though not exactly on all fours, used similar language
in ruling that the provisions of the statute could hardly be applicable to parties who were not creditors at the time of the
transfer and who only might become creditors upon the happening of some contingency.
Though there has been some difficulty in the various states
as to what persons are creditors within the meaning of the Bulk
Sales Act, a search has revealed but one case, decided in Tennessee in 1913, holding that an assignee of a creditor can claim
the rights which his assignor had at the time of the transfer
of the goods in bulk, though he became an assignee subsequent
to such transfer. 6 Such a holding is in direct conflict with the
decisions which uniformly hold that the act was designed to
protect those persons who were creditors at the time of the sale
alleged to be fraudulent.
KATHERINE

Is

H.

JOHNSON

THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AN HEIR OF THE DECEASED

WHO DIES TESTATEP?-The

SPOUSE
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4 Cases collected in 84 A. L. R. 1406.

5 Apex Leasing Co., Inc. v. Litke, 159 N. Y. S. 707 (1916).
6 Daly v. Sumpter Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155 S. W. 167 (1913).
1 For an article on the general subject, see "Husband and Wife as 'Heir'
under Testate Succession" by William F. Zacharias, 12 CHICAGO-KENT REV.
264 (1934).
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trict of Illinois was called upon to determine this question in
the recent case of Rock Island Bank and Trust Company v.
Bladel.2 In that case it appeared that a sum of money had been
delivered by a third person to the Rock Island Bank and Trust
Company as trustee, to pay over the income for life to certain
designated persons, and after their death to deliver up the corpus
to their son, with the further provision that in event of the son's
death before becoming entitled to the same, then it was to be
paid to his "legal heirs." The son died testate, survived by
his wife, before becoming entitled to the trust fund. Upon the
death of the life beneficiaries, the surviving wife claimed the
fund as sole heir of her deceased husband.
The court denied her claim, stating that the descent of property in Illinois is regulated wholly by statute; that an "heir"
is one whom the law appoints to succeed to the estate in case
of intestacy; that a surviving spouse is not an heir under the
Descent Act 8 unless two things concur: first, that the deceased
spouse die without child or children or descendants of children,
and second, that he die intestate. The court concluded that as
the deceased husband had died testate, the surviving wife failed
to bring herself within the statute and therefore was not an heir
of her deceased husband.
As authority for its decision, the court cites the case of Hall
v. Ray, Executor,4 where under a similar state of facts the court
reached the same conclusion as in the instant case. It is interesting to note that both cases were decided in the same district
of the appellate court and both opinions were written by the
same justice.
Numerous cases in Illinois have laid down the principle that
in the absence of anything in the instrument calling for a special construction, an "heir" is that person designated by statute
to succeed to the estate of another in case of intestacy. 5 It has
also been held in a number of Supreme Court decisions, that even
where the decedent died testate the rules of descent as established
by statute determine who are his legal heirs. 6
Ill. App. 437 (1935).
8 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 39, par. 1.
2 281

4 275 Ill. App. 344 (1934).
5 Rawson v. Rawson, 52 Ill. 62 (1869) ;
(1872) ; Potter v. Potter, 306 Ill. 37, 137
Emery, 325 Ill. 212, 156 N. E. 364 (1927).
6 Rawson v. Rawson, 52 111. 62 (1869);
(1872) ; Kelley et al. v. Vigas, 112 Ill. 242

Ill.
212, 156 N. E. 364 (1927).

Richards v. Miller, 62 I1. 417
N. E. 425 (1922); Emery v.
Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 417
(1884) ; Emery v. Emery, 325
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The appellate court, in deciding that a decedent dying testate
deprives those persons appointed by law of their legal status
as heirs, has apparently overlooked the Supreme Court decisions
which have held otherwise, and which are amply supported by
authority as well as logic.

L. G.

RICHMAN

